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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

Workmen's Compensafion As Exclusive Remedy
Liability has been imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law upon the owner
of a motor vehicle for the negligence of any person operating the vehicle upon
a public highway with the express or implied permission of the owner.' The
purpose of the statute was to change the common law rule by making the owner
of the vehicle liable - in order to afford the injured person an additional remedy
for his losses.
Section 29, subdivision 6, of the Workmen's Compensation Law provides:
The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall
be the exclusive remedy to an employee, or in the case of death his
dependents, when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence
or wrong of another in the same employ.
The question whether this section of the Workmen's Compensation Law
could be vitiated, in part, by the provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was
presented to the Court of Appeals in Nasco v. Lafata3 and Rauch v. Jones.4 In
each of these cases the plaintiff was injured when involved in a motor vehicle
accident caused by the negligence of a co-employee driver of the vehicle in which
plaintiff was a passenger and while both plaintiff and driver were acting in the
course of their employment. Recovery was sought under the Vehicle and Traffic
Law against the employer-owner of the vehicle in the Naso case and a third party
owner of the trailer in the Rauch case. The owner in each case was not present at
the time of the accident.
The Court disallowed recovery because of the exclusive remedy provisions
of §29(6), recognizing that to treat the vehicle owner, under the circumstances,
as a third party whose liability is not eliminated by provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Law is to disregard the import of other provisions of the Law
specifying a third party suit "only if the employee is injured or killed by one not
in the same employ."' 5 The Appellate Division, in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff in the Naso case on the grounds that the owner could be treated as a
third party had seemingly overlooked this vital consideration.
Primary emphasis was placed by the Court of Appeals on the right of the
1. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFic LAwv §59. A similar liability has been imposed
jointly on the separate owners of a tractor and trailer, in combination; see §59-a.
2. Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd
284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940).
3. 4 N.Y.2d 585, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1958).
4. .4 N.Y.2d 585, 592, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622, -628 (1958).
5.

N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAxv §29(1).
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owner of an auto, sued under the Vehicle and Traffic Law and not present at the
time of the accident, to implead the actively negligent' driver of his vehicle and
to obtain recovery over against him under section 193-a of the Civil Practice Act.'
The Court said that if the plaintiff were allowed to recover against the owner
here in either of the cases, the cwner would then have a right of recovery over
against the co-employee driver, thus defeating the injured employee's bar from
bringing action against his co-employee (and, in fact, thereby defeating the
co-employee's immunity from suit) under the "exdusive remedy" provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Jurisdiction Where Job Sifus Outside State
Workers today may often be called upon to do various jobs outside the state.
This raises a close question as to where the employment is "located" for purposes
of determining jurisdiction in workmen's compensation cases. The New York
Workmen's Compensation Law does not contain any provision for the granting
of compensation to New York employees who are injured while outside its
territorial limits. However, it has been interpreted, in appropriate cases, to extend
7
to such employees.
The test in such cases is whether the work performed outside the state was in
its nature transitory and incidental to general employment in New York or
whether the employment was at a fixed location outside the state. There is no
rigid rule for determining this, but it is rather on evaluation of the significant
contacts with the state.8 Thus it appears that the facts of each case will govern
the decisions and not juristic concepts.
In Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co.,9 the deceased employee was a
resident of New York and his employment was controlled and directed from this
state. The decedent had worked as a steam cleaner at various jobs for his New
York employer from 1945 until 1950, when he was sent to New Jersey to work
on a specific project. For purposes of union. regulations, he was designated as a
New York employee and received boarding expenses while working outside of
the state. He was also covered by a compensation policy procured in New York
and there was an understanding that he would return to this state after the New
Jersey assignment.
The Court felt that these factors, coupled with the presumption of coverage
6.
7.
8.
9.

Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N.Y. 395, 131 N.E.2d 564 (1955).
In re Post, 216 N.Y. 544, 111 N.E. 351 (1916).
Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930).
4 N.Y.2d 199, 173 N.Y.S.2d -565 (1958).

